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Abstract
This paper addresses the role of taxes over the ﬁrm’s investment decisions. We pro-
pose a framework that considers microeconomic decisions to evaluate aggregate eﬀects
of taxes over the economy’s investment dynamics.
We obtain strong results and policy recommendations. First, and contrary to other
studies, we conclude that the tax system signiﬁcatively aﬀects the long run level of
capital stock in the economy. Second, we indicate that the ”ﬁrst-best” policy is to
tax retired proﬁts rather than current proﬁts. Third, when the ”ﬁrst-best” policy is
not available, because it does not provide enough revenues, we should implement a tax
system that minimize the distortion over the relative price of investment. This tax
system is a mixture of zero investment subsidies (credit to investment and depreciation
allowances) and positive, but small, corporate tax.
We simulate the eﬀects of those tax policies in an economy with heterogenous ﬁrms
and, under a reasonable set of parameters, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of a tax in current
proﬁts over the long run level of capital stock, may be as large as 43 per cent of capital
stock, when we compare an economy with no distortions versus an economy with a 15
per cent corporate tax rate.
¤The University of Chicago. Correspondence address: 1215 E. Hyde Park Blvd, Apt. 204, Chicago, IL,
60615; e-mail: r-cerda@uchicago.edu.
1INTRODUCTION
The determinants of investment is a topic of considerable relevance among economist and
government authorities due to its impacts in diﬀerent areas of economic interest. One of
these areas, which is one of the principal concerns of the economic authorities, is its eﬀect
in the country’s growth rate (and thus in per capita output) as investment might be one of
the engines behind larger growth rates.
This paper focuses in obtaining policy lessons that can be applied in the case of Chile1.
Even though there is some economic literature studying investment in Chile, we pursue this
topic because the study of investment in Chile has mainly focused in empirical research
that uses aggregate data. However, this analysis makes quite diﬃcult to understand the
behavior of ﬁrms, which are the ones making the decisions about capital investments. Firms
in Chile, as in the rest of the world, seem to be quite heterogenous and thus decisions diﬀer
across ﬁrms. Camhi, Engel and Micco (1997) focused in the labor heterogeneity across
ﬁrms in Chile and showed that aggregated movements in labor were due to job creation, job
destruction plus reallocation of employment across incumbent ﬁrms. This case shows that
focusing in aggregated data to describe economic behavior implies an over-simpliﬁcation of
the problem that eliminates important microeconomic information.
It should be said that the line of research that uses aggregate data has been mainly pur-
sued due to the scarcity of other types of data sets. Recently, Bustos, Engel and Galetovic
(1998) -BEG- provided a diﬀerent econometric analysis. They studied ﬁrms’ investment
problem and tested their conclusion by using an annual panel of ﬁrms, with data ranging
from 1985 to 1995. A characteristic of the data set is that it included only ﬁrms classiﬁed
as ”Sociedades Anonimas Abiertas”2 which size, in general, is considerable larger than the
medium ﬁrm size of the economy. This selection problem of the data set do not allow to
extend the results over the Chilean economy though.
1however the analysis is quite general and thus the result might be extended to other countries with a
economic structure similar to the one here considered.
2Firms which stock is traded in the Chilean stock market
2This paper, rather than using aggregated (macro) data or rather than extending the anal-
ysis of BEG, will provide simulations for the Chilean economy under diﬀerent assumptions.
To simulate, we build the aggregated eﬀects in the economy starting from the microeco-
nomic decisions of the ﬁrms. Thus we ﬁrst solve ﬁrms’ problems and later we aggregate
these decisions.
The microeconomic speciﬁcation, and its posterior aggregation, allows us to understand
precisely the dynamics of investment and the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in this decisions. Addi-
tionally to these qualitative results, it allows us to obtain some quantitative results. These
quantitative results rely in one hand in the speciﬁcation used to model the economy but
also, in the set of parameters chosen to produce the simulation. The attractiveness of this
last property, is that we might borrow those parameters from microeconometric studies
which is more reliable than the one obtained from the use of aggregated data.
A second characteristic of this paper is that it answers questions concerning tax policy
such as: Is there an eﬀect over investment if we tax ﬁrms’ proﬁts? if yes, Is there a tax
system that minimize those distortions? Are those eﬀects signiﬁcants? What are the qual-
itative and quantitative eﬀects of depreciation allowances (and/or investment credits) over
investment decisions? We try to answer those questions to illustrate the importance of re-
moving ”distortions” that aﬀect the microeconomic level (each individual ﬁrm, in our case).
In fact, we will show that we may obtain large eﬀects at the aggregate (macroeconomic)
level.
The way we proceed is the following. First, we assume there is a large number of ﬁrms
in the economy and we solve each ﬁrm’s decision problem. This property allow us to work
with heterogeneous ﬁrms. The heterogeneity among ﬁrms will depend in shocks aﬀecting
the productivity of each them. Thus, even when the ﬁrms might have similar technologies
(production functions), each ﬁrm has an individual shock that alters the production func-
tion. We will show that this eﬀect might produce considerable diﬀerences in investment
decisions at the ﬁrm level.
To solve each ﬁrm’s problem3, we choose some functional forms. First, we assume a
3each ﬁrm solves the allocation of investment over time
3quadratic investment cost, as in the ”adjustment cost” literature. Second, we assume a
general speciﬁcation of the ﬁscal policy that can be specialized to (1) the case of corporate
taxes which base are the ﬁrms’ current proﬁts, (2) the case of corporate taxes which base are
retired proﬁts, (3) the existence of depreciation allowances or, (4) investment tax credits.
Variations in tax policies will produce variation in investment decision at the ﬁrm level.
Later, we will aggregate the ﬁrms’ decisions to obtain the aggregate allocations of the
economy. To do so, we will obtain the stationary distribution of ﬁrms -meaning, we will
obtain the long run fraction of ﬁrms with a given capital stock and, we will repeat the
exercise for any possible level of capital stock.
To validate the output of the model, we obtain the empirical distribution of ﬁrms across
investment decisions and we compare the moments of the distribution obtained from the
simulation of the model with the moments of the actual distribution. Hence, if the model
reproduces the observed empirical distribution of ﬁrms, we can be conﬁdent of the output
of the analysis and policy recommendations obtained from it.
The analysis provides some interesting qualitative conclusions. First corporate taxes,
which base are the ﬁrms’ (current) proﬁts, aﬀect negatively the long run capital stock. This
result is quite intuitive: an increase in the tax rate decreases the rental rate of return from
capital stock (marginal beneﬁt of investment), and it provides less incentives to accumulate
capital stock.
The second conclusion is that corporate taxes, with retired proﬁts as base, do not distort
the optimal investment decision. We show that this type of tax is similar to a mixture
between corporate taxes based in current proﬁts plus investment tax credits (or alternatively
depreciation allowances), where both type of taxes have the same magnitude. The eﬀect of
the policy is that as above the marginal beneﬁt from capital is decreased but additionally,
the marginal cost of investment is also negatively aﬀected. These two eﬀects have opposite
impacts in investment that oﬀset each other. This is a very important result because it allow
to tax the capital stock (and collect revenue) without aﬀecting its dynamic accumulation.
We also provide quantitative measure of the eﬀect of taxes in any of those systems. These
quantitative results show that the tax policy produce quite important eﬀects. In fact if we
4consider the introduction of a corporate tax (current proﬁts) equal to 20 per cent, the long
run level of capital stock decrease in almost 50 per cent compared to the case with no tax.
What is the optimal tax policy conditional in a given level of government revenue col-
lection? Even when we indicate that the ”ﬁrst-best” tax policy is to implement a retired
proﬁts tax system, this system might not provide enough revenues as required by the ﬁscal
budget. Thus we characterize a ”second-best” policy (the one providing enough revenues).
The ”second-best” policy is chosen among the set of possible policies that provide a given
level of tax revenue. The chosen policy is the one providing larger capital accumulation (and
thus larger investment) and it corresponds to the one with the smallest possible corporate tax
rate. This result may seem obvious, but it is not. In fact for a given government revenue, we
have a set of policies in which as we increase the corporate tax rate we might also increase
the investment tax credit or the depreciation allowances at the same time (thus we hold
constant total revenue). It might be tempting to choose those policies that provide larger
investment tax credits, as a way of providing incentives to capital accumulation, however
these policies should have associated a larger corporate tax which aﬀect negatively capital
accumulation. Thus the main policy lesson is that if the retired proﬁt tax system is not
available, because it does not provide enough revenues, we should choose a tax system that
minimize distortions over the relative price of investment.
The paper is developed in the following way. Section 2 describes a very simple ﬁrm’s
problem that highlights the main intuition of this paper. Section 3 presents a more realistic
economic environment and builds the aggregate behavior of the economy, starting from
the ﬁrm’s microeconomic structure (it states the ﬁrm’s problem, indicates the information
structure and explains the way the economy is aggregated). Section 4 presents a simulation
of this economy under diﬀerent tax regimes and discusses the results. Finally section 5
concludes.
5A FIRST APPROXIMATION TO THE EFFECTS OF TAXES ON
INVESTMENT DECISIONS
In this section, we will specify a simple problem for a representative ﬁrm that chooses the
path of its investment in capital stock. This case will provide us with the main intuition
behind this paper.
We will assume that the representative ﬁrm has a time horizon ranging from t=0 to
inﬁnity. At each period of time, the ﬁrm is endowed with a given level of capital stock,
kt. This capital stock is used to obtain corporate proﬁts which are denoted as ¼(kt), where
¼0 > 0;¼00 < 0. Corporate proﬁts are not ”economic” proﬁts as they only deduct variable
costs - e.g. labor cost or the cost of other variable inputs. Hence they might be deﬁned
simply as capital compensation. The government taxes corporate proﬁts at the rate ¿t, that
might vary over time.
After-tax corporate proﬁts might be used to invest in future capital stock (reinvestment
of proﬁts) or might be retired from the ﬁrm by the ﬁrm’s owners. If the proﬁts are rein-
vested, the ﬁrm faces adjustment cost. To model this characteristic, we will assume the
ﬁrm has an increasing and concave adjustment cost function, c(It), where It is investment
t. The investment costs face a subsidy from the government equal to a rate ¾t of total in-
vestment cost. Furthermore capital stock depreciation, from the corporate tax perspective,
is analogous to variable cost and thus they decrease tax payments. Hence another eﬀect of
investment over ﬁrm’s tax payments is depreciation allowances. We will assume that the
present value of depreciation allowances of current investment is the rate zt of the total
investment cost.
Finally, the capital stock of the ﬁrm follows the law of motion: kt+1 = It + (1 ¡ ±)kt,
where ± is depreciation rate. We will assume that the ﬁrm might borrow or lend at the





Rt[(1 ¡ ¿t)¼(kt) ¡ (1 ¡ ¾t ¡ zt)C(It)]
s:a
6kt+1 = It ¡ ±kt (1)
Where Rt = ( 1
1+r0)( 1
1+r1)::( 1
1+rt) and the associated ﬁrst order condition with respect to
investment at time t is:








1 ¡ ¾t ¡ zt
(3)
Condition (2) indicates that the ﬁrm chooses investment such that it equates the marginal
beneﬁt of investment (the left hand side) with its marginal cost (right hand side). The
marginal beneﬁt is the present value of the increase in future proﬁts while the marginal cost
is the present value of the decrements in retired resources (proﬁts) from the ﬁrm, as those
resources are used instead to invest in capital stock.
Condition (3) rewrites condition (2) in a very intuitive way. It states an equality between
the marginal rate of transformation of current retirement of proﬁts versus future retirement
of proﬁts (left hand side) with its ratio of prices (right hand side). In fact, investment is
a way of transforming current proﬁts into future proﬁts, throughout the accumulation of
capital stock. To clarify the point, note that a marginal increase in investment produces
a lower retirement of proﬁts from the ﬁrm, equal to C0(It) while, its associated marginal
beneﬁt is the increase in future proﬁts, which is equal to ¼0(kt+1).
The right hand side of (3) shows that the capital market allows to transform a unit of
future income into current income at the rate 1
rt+1. However this price, which is the price of
investment, is modiﬁed by the ﬁscal tax system. Larger investment credits (or depreciation
allowances) decrease investment prices and thus makes cheaper to transform current in
future proﬁts. In the same way, a larger future corporate tax rate provides smaller proﬁts
for each unit of current proﬁt sacriﬁced and thus makes more expensive to invest. Hence
we may conclude that as the tax system varies, the price of investment varies. Thus two
simple conclusions emerge. First, a larger future tax in corporate proﬁts, ¿t+1, will decrease
investment4. The intuition is quite clear in this case, as investment price rises. Second,
4simple comparative statics show this result
7larger subsidies to investment -investment tax credits or depreciation allowances- provide
incentives to increase investment because its prices is smaller.
This quite simple framework is shown in ﬁgure 1. The ﬁgure presents the ﬁrm’s decision in
the plane current proﬁt retirement, dt, and future proﬁt retirement, dt+1. Point A shows the
maximum current retirement of proﬁts, e dt = (1 ¡ ¿t)¼(kt)5 while point B is the maximum
future retirement of proﬁts6, g dt+1 = (1 ¡ ¿t+1)¼(kt+1). Those points deﬁne the budget
constraint. Notice that the marginal rate of transformation is strictly convex to the origin
due to the properties of ¼00;C00. It follows that a unique equilibrium (d¤
t;d¤
t+1) exists. Total
investment at time t is deﬁned as I¤
t = (1 ¡ ¿t)¼(kt) ¡ d¤
t.
Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀect of increasing future corporate tax rate, e.g the increase
of ¿t+1, holding constant ¿t
7. In this case, as we indicated above, the relative price of
substituting dt by dt+1 (investment price) is smaller and thus the budget constraint moves
inwards. It should be noticed that current after-tax proﬁts are not aﬀected, though. Hence





t which implies an increase in investment. Conversely, an increase in ¾t or zt
produces the opposite eﬀects because the relative price of investment rises.
Figure 2 shows an additional exercise, e.g. an increase in ¿t while holding constant ¿t+1.
In this case, the relative price of investment do not vary while the maximum amount of
current retired proﬁts is lowered. Thus point A moves to the left in the graph while the
slope of the budget remains the same. Thus the budget constraint moves inwards in parallel,
producing a negative income eﬀect. In this case, investment decreases because for any initial
level of capital stock, the ﬁrm has less ”income” to spent in investment however, there is
no negative substitution eﬀect in investment. This case is similar to the Chamley (1986)
result stating that the optimal capital tax rate should be zero in the long run if there is an
asympotic steady state and markets are complete. The intuition is that we will not distort
investment decisions in the long run and taxing the initial level of capital stock is similar
5Associated with zero future retirement of proﬁts
6Associated with zero current retirement of proﬁts
7investment credits and depreciation allowances are also held constant.
8to a lump-sum tax, producing a simple income eﬀect.
[Insert ﬁgure 1 and 2]
Finally, an obvious extension of this framework is to notice that ﬁxing investment sub-
sidies and future corporate tax rate at the same rate, e.g. ¿ = ¾ + z;8t, relative prices
are not distorted and thus we do not have eﬀect of the tax system over optimal dynamics
investment decisions8. Note that in this case we might write after-tax proﬁt as in:
(1 ¡ ¿t)¼(kt) ¡ (1 ¡ ¾t ¡ zt)C(It) = (1 ¡ ¿t)[¼(kt) ¡ C(It)] (4)
Where ¼(kt) ¡ C(It) are the retired proﬁts from the ﬁrms. This is an special case in
which ﬁrms pay taxes over its retirement of proﬁts only -proﬁts are not taxed if they are
reinvested- and, in which optimal investment decisions are not distorted by taxes. This is
one of the main conclusions of the paper.
Next section will extend this framework to allow heterogeneity across ﬁrms. This variation
of the model will allow us to explain diﬀerence in investment and size of ﬁrms. We will
argue that similar conclusions, to the above stated, will hold. Simulations will provide us
with approximations to the quantitative eﬀects of the tax system.
THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
The ﬁrm’s problem
In our economy, there will be a large number of ﬁrms that ”live” between time t=0 to
inﬁnity. Each ﬁrm will face a similar -but not equal- problem that we will describe next.
As in the last section, each ﬁrm is endowed at the beginning of each period of time
t with a given level of capital stock, kit, where i 2 Ω indexes ﬁrms and Ω is the set of
ﬁrms in the economy.. Similarly to above, capital stock is used to obtain corporate proﬁts.
Capital compensation is not homogeneous across ﬁrms in the economy. In fact, we will
8Up to the lump-sum income eﬀect
9assume that each ﬁrm in the economy is aﬀected by an individual shock, w, that modiﬁes
corporate proﬁts. This shock has three possible states of nature, e.g. w 2 (w1;w2;w3)
where w1 < w2 < w3. We will denote corporate proﬁts, after uncertainty is resolved, by
wt¼(kt), where wt indicates the ﬁrm’s shock at t. We will assume that the government taxes
this capital compensation at the rate ¿t.
The after-tax corporate proﬁts can be used (1) to invest in capital stock accumulation or
(2) to pay dividends to the ﬁrm’s owners. As in the adjustment cost literature, we assume
that the ﬁrm faces a convex cost for its investment. We will also assume that the adjustment
cost function is negatively aﬀected by its initial level of capital stock, kt. Let C = C(It;kt)
be the adjustment cost function. As usual the rationality of these assumption deals with
”internal” or ”external” adjustment costs of the ﬁrm. The main eﬀect of this assumption
is an incentive to smooth investment over time. Later in the paper, we will modify this
assumption as a way to see how the model behaves under diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The
properties of the adjustment cost function are CI;CII > 0;Ck < 0;Ckk > 0.
In addition to the capital compensation tax rate, we will assume that the government
provides (1) an investment tax credit, ¾t, as a fraction of investment costs of the ﬁrm and,
(2) depreciation allowances. We will denote by Dt(s) the date t depreciation allowance for
each unit of capital of age s. Hence, the corporate income tax paid by the ﬁrm at time t is:




This equation might be quite general and might be consistent with diﬀerent tax systems,
which will be analyzed later.
To ﬁnally present the problem of a ﬁrm, we will specify the law of motion of capital stock
and some additional notation. Since we have heterogeneity across ﬁrms, we may assume
that depreciation rate face of ﬁrms, ±i, diﬀer across ﬁrms. Thus the law of motion capital
is kit+1 = Iit ¡ ±ikit.
As additional notation, we will deﬁne the story of shocks of ﬁrm i at time t:
10wt
i = (wi0;wi1;:::;wit)
Notice that in the above deﬁnition when time is used as a superscript, it indicates the
story of shocks until t while when t is used as subscript, it indicates the the current shock.
Also, let Prob(wt
ijw0
i) be the probability of occurrence of shock wt
i evaluated at t=0 and
conditional in the shock occurred at that moment and Rt = ( 1
1+r1):::( 1
1+rt) be the discount
factor used by the ﬁrm -which depends in the interest rate, rt, obtained from the capital
market.
Using this notation, we may deﬁne the problem of a ﬁrm endowed with some initial level































A couple of remarks of this problem are the followings. First, this problem is a version of
problem (1), stated last section, that includes uncertainty. Second, we index the investment
decision by the story of shocks (conditional in the initial shock which is known). Intuitively
the indexation matters because a ﬁrm with a larger number of positive shock will be able to
spend a larger amount in investment. Third, we assume that the investment decision must
belong to a set of values that we denote ·. This set will play an important role. Suppose
we want to discuss the case of irreversibility in investment. In that case, · will only include
positive values. Another case to consider might be liquidity constraints in investment. If we
assume that ﬁrms cannot borrow to invest, the maximum possible investment of the ﬁrm is
11the total amount of after-tax corporate proﬁts occurred in the period. This last property
will impose an upper-bound to the set ·.


































Rt Dt+s(s)¿t+s, which is the present value of contri-
butions to the proﬁts of the ﬁrm (value of the ﬁrm) of current and anticipated depreciation
allowances, for each dollar spent in capital stock accumulation at time t.
The expression indicates that total depreciation allowances of the ﬁrm might be decom-
posed in two terms: the ﬁrst term corresponds to investment made in the past while the
second corresponds to depreciation allowances due to current and future investments. No-
tice that since the ﬁrst term correspond to past investments, it does not aﬀect current and
future investment decisions and thus it will be neglected in the future.
This property of depreciation allowances plus the separability over time of the proﬁt
function allow to write the ﬁrm’s problem in a dynamic programming setup, as in (this













































12program is just another way of writing problem 5):
V (kit;wk




t )¼(kit) ¡ (1 ¡ ¾t ¡ zt)C(Iit((wk














t ) = Iit(wk
t ) ¡ ±ikit;
kit+1(wk
t ) 2 Γ
Where V (kit;wk
t ) is the value function10 conditional in capital endowment and shock at
time t11. The problem shows that the marginal cost of investment is not only aﬀected by
investment tax credits but also, by depreciation allowances over those investment costs.
Note that we replace investment by future capital stock as decision variable, hence the set
Γ is analogous to ·.
A useful property of this problem, as in any dynamic programming problem, is the
solution being function only of the state variables. Hence, the solution for a single ﬁrm
i at time t might be written as kit+1 = g(kit;wk
t ), where g is a single-valued function. This
solution is known in the literature as policy function (see Stockey, Lucas and Prescott,
1989 or Ljunqvist and Sargent, 2001). To solve the dynamic problem we will use numerical
methods later in the paper.
The aggregate economy
The above procedure solved the problem of each of the ﬁrms in the economy. We turn next
to characterize the long run aggregate behavior of the economy. To simplify the notation,
we will eliminate the time index and we will use a prime to indicate future period of time
-thus primes indicate next period variables rather than derivatives.
The heterogeneity across ﬁrms determine diﬀerent investment rates and capital stocks
10maximum welfare attainable given preferences, technology, information and the state variables
11kit;w
k
t are the state variables
13across ﬁrms. In fact notice that from the ﬁrms’ solution, k0 = g(k;w), ﬁrms with the same
initial level of capital may have diﬀerent future levels of capital stock (and hence diﬀerent
investment rates). This result depends in the shock. If ex-ante equal ﬁrms have a diﬀerent
shocks, the policy function determines diﬀerent levels of capital stock in the future. To
characterize the long run behavior of the economy, we will determine the distribution of
capital stock across ﬁrms. This distribution will, in fact, determine the long run level of
capital stock. For instance, a distribution of ﬁrms that is skewed to low levels of capital
stock will produce a low long run level of aggregated capital stock -the economy will have
too few ﬁrms holding a large levels of capital but a large fraction holding a low level of
capital. The contrary will hold if the distribution is skewed to larger levels of capital stock.
To characterize the distribution of ﬁrms, we deﬁne:
¸t(k;w) = Prob(kt = k;wt = w)
This function indicates the fraction of ﬁrms holding k as capital stock and having a shock
w. Varying k and w over the support of capital stock and shocks will deﬁne a distribution
function that, as usual, integrates to one. To characterize the dynamic behavior of the
economy, we will determine the evolution of the distribution function over time. Note that
the distribution function in the next period of time is:





Prob(kt+1 = k0;wt+1 = s0;kt = k;wt = s)
Where the equality follows from the properties of joint distributions. Using the joint
distributions of current and future capital stock and of current ad future shock, (k0;w0;k;w),
is useful because using Bayes’ rule, we get:











Prob(kt+1 = k0jkt = k;wt = w)Prob(wt+1 = w0jwt = s)Prob(kt = k;wt = w)






1(k0;k;w)Prob(wt+1 = w0jwt = w)¸t(k;w)
Where 1(k0;k;w) is an indicator function equal to one if k0 = g(k;s) and zero otherwise.
This indicator function replaces Prob(kt+1 = k0jkt = k;wt = w) because the policy function
is single-valued, meaning that there is a unique future level of capital stock for a combination
(k;w). Hence conditional in (k;w) the probability of choosing k0 is zero if the future level
of capital is diﬀerent from the one dictated by the policy function and one if we take the







¸t(k;w)Prob(wt+1 = w0jwt = w) (7)
This expression is quite intuitive. It indicates that the ”t+1” fraction of ﬁrms with capital
stock and shock (k0;w0) will depend in how it evolves the distribution at t. In fact, if we
take a given group at t, e.g. the fraction ¸t(k;w), they will evolve to the group ¸t+1(k0;w0)
if: (1) the future shock is w0, conditional in the current shock being w and, (2) the future
capital stock -the ﬁrm choose- is k0. This last property depends in the policy function.
Finally, the summation indicates that we sum over all initial distribution of ﬁrms.
A property of the distribution function is that whenever Prob(w0jw) > 0;8(w;w0), the
distribution function converges asymptotically to a long run distribution12, ¸(k;s). This
long run distribution can be used to obtain the long run level of capital stock (and thus the






12Stockey, Lucas and Prescott, 1989; Ljunqvist and Sargent, 2001
15Where g(k;w) is the policy function which indicates the optimal decision level of capital
stock if the state variables are (k;w) and, ¸(k;w) is the fraction of households with the
state variables (k;w).





¸(k;w)[¿ts(w)¼(g(k;w)) ¡ (1 ¡ ¾t ¡ zt)C(g(k;w)(1 + ±);g(k;w))] (9)
This expression indicates that government revenue depends tax policy; in each ﬁrm’s
optimal decision, g(k;w); in the fraction of ﬁrms choosing a particular solution and; in the
shock s(w) that aﬀects long run proﬁts.
The economy is completely characterized by equations (6) to (9). We will next simulate
its behavior under diﬀerent assumptions.
SIMULATIONS
The structure
We turn now to simulate the economy. We use those simulations because the solutions
to the individual’s problem might be highly non-linear and thus very diﬃcult to solve. The
simulation, through the use of computer capacities, helps us in the task.
To simulate the economy we will assume some functional forms. First, the production
function and the cost function will be ¼(kt) = k0:7
t , C(It;kt) = C0(It +
I2
t
2kt);C0 > 0. Addi-
tionally, we will assume that the interest rate is ﬁxed at 5 percent, while the depreciation
rate will be set at 5 percent also. The production function here assumed is similar to assume
a capital share equal to 70 percent and the adjustment cost function follows the speciﬁcation
commonly used in the literature.
The shock are going to be speciﬁed as w1 < 0;w2 = 1;w3 > 1. We specify w1 < 0
because this is similar to assume negative corporate proﬁts for the ﬁrm in the ”bad” state
of nature. The case w2 = 0 implies a completely neutral shock to the production function
16while w3 > 1 indicates a state of nature where the production function is positively aﬀected.
Finally, we need to specify the transition matrix, e.g. the matrix containing the probability
of being in a future state of nature, conditional in the current state of nature. In other
words, the transition matrix provides the probabilities, for a ﬁrm, of having a positive,
neutral or negative shock conditional in the current state of nature. Cerda, S. and Zurita,
F. (2001) provide a similar transition matrix for the case of the Chilean economy in the
period 1960-2000. To calculate this matrix, they basically calculate these probabilities by
using the growth rate of the Chilean GDP. For instance, they calculated the probability of
a boom (positive shock) if the current state was a boom, using data of GDP between 1960
and 2000, and they repeated the calculation for each possible combination of future state
and current state. We will base our calculations in their transition matrix. Thus we will
assume that the transition matrix is:
future shock
Negative Neutral Positive
0.568 0.146 0.286 Negative
0.182 0.364 0.454 Neutral current shock
0.1 0.26 0.65 Positive
To simulate, we form a grid of 267 capital stock points starting at zero at a distance
of 0.03 among them. We will evaluate each of those 267 capital stock points and we will
determine which one is the optimal decision for the ﬁrm. Notice that we assume that capital
stock is always positive. This is similar to assume irreversibility in investment (investment
must be always positive).
We will solve two sequential problems. First, we solve the problem for each ﬁrm in the
economy through the use of the Bellman equation -equation 6 above stated13
13To solve the ﬁrms’ Bellman equation, we will index by i the capital stock (in our grid of 267 points) and
by h the shock of the ﬁrms. Thus for each pair (i;h), i 2 [1;:::;m] and h 2 [1;::;n]-where m=267 and n=3-,
17Later and using the solutions of the above problem, we solve the stationary distribution
of ﬁrms across capital stock -equation 714.
We describe next the empirical observations and the results when we used diﬀerent tax
systems.
The empirical observations and the results
The empirical distribution of ﬁrms across investment decisions was obtained from the
1990-1996 versions of the ENIA15. This survey provides data about a panel of ﬁrms in the
industrial sector of the Chilean economy. Among the data, it is possible to ﬁnd the ﬂow of
investment at each year for each ﬁrm, measured in millions of Chilean pesos. Figures 3 to 9
plots the distribution of ﬁrms across investment for all ﬁrms with positive investment rate
and they show the associated descriptive statics16.
[Insert ﬁgures 3 to 9]
we will solve the following Bellman equation:
v(k(i);w(h)) = max










To solve this problem we iterate in the Bellman equation until we converge to the unique value function.
To do so, we guess an initial value function and we replace this value in the right hand side. We solve the
maximization problem and we compute the optimal value of the problem (the left hand side of the equation)
which becomes our new value function. If the initial guess was correct, we stop and we had solved the
problem. If the initial guess is diﬀerent from the new value function, we used this last function as initial
value for the next iteration. We iterate until convergence is acquired. In that case, the optimal capital stock
is the one that solved the last iteration. To solve this problem we use the computer program Matlab 6.0.
The computer problem is available from the author by request.
14Similarly to the Bellman equation case, to solve for the stationary distribution, we start with any initial
distribution and we iterate in equation 7 until we converge to the stationary distribution.
15”Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual” elaborated by the INE
16The distribution that includes ﬁrms with no positive investment is similar
18As it is possible to conclude from the ﬁgures, ﬁrms do choose diﬀerent levels of invest-
ment because the distribution is clearly not degenerated. Firms concentrate at low level
of investment, even though there is a signiﬁcant fraction of ﬁrms with larger investment.
In addition, the distribution is quite stable across time indicating that there are similar
incentives to invest in this time period.
We initially simulate the model with no distortion, e.g corporate taxes, investment tax
credits and depreciation allowances are set equal to zero. Figure 10 to 12 show the optimal
decision rules for ﬁrms with negative, neutral and positive shocks17. Not surprisingly, for
any initial levels of capital stock ﬁrms with positive or neutral shocks accumulate larger
capital. This is because the shocks act like an income eﬀect that allows larger capital stock
accumulation. The optimal policy function, in all the three cases, is quite concave. This is
due to the convexity of the adjustment cost function that provides incentives to accumulate
larger capital stock for smaller levels of investments.
[Insert ﬁgures 10 to 12]
Figure 13 plots the stationary distribution of ﬁrms across capital stock18.
The distribution seems to match quite well the observed distribution, as seen in the ﬁgure
in 13 when compared to ﬁgures 3 to 9. Columns 1 to 7 of table 1 present the descriptive
statistics of the distribution obtained from the ENIA for each year, where the moments
are measured as fraction of the mean of the distribution (we use this measure as a way of
normalization). As we observe, the moments of the distribution almost do not change over
time. The seventh column shows the mean of the moments in the period 1990-96, which
are quite similar to the moments in any of the distribution measured per year. Column
8 presents the moment of the distribution obtained when we simulate our economy. The
moments seems to be in line with the ”true” moments. In fact, the simulated standard
deviation and the skewness of the distributions are quite similar to the ”true” ones. Even
17This is the result of solving the Bellman equation -equation 6- when the tax system is absent.
18Which is analogous to investment decisions since they should diﬀer only by the depreciation rate in the
long run.
19though the ”simulated” kurtosis has the same sign (positive) as the ”true” kurtosis, its
magnitude is very large. Thus the result are in general satisfactory with the exception of
the kurtosis.
[Insert ﬁgure 13 and table 1]
We will next introduce a tax over current ﬁrm proﬁts. We will simulate this case by
assuming ¿ = 0:15;¾ = z = 019. Figure 14 shows the stationary distribution of ﬁrms in this
case, while the eight column of table 1 presents the moments of the simulated distribution.
Comparing ﬁgure 13 and 14, we observe that the distribution shift to the left and therefore
the introduction of the corporate tax in current proﬁts decreases the per ﬁrm level of
capital stock in the long run. The results show that the average level of capital stock in
the economy drops in almost 43 per cent20. A second conclusion, which emerge from the
moments of the simulated distribution is that the size of kurtosis decreases, similar to the
”true” distribution21. This result is quite interesting because this tax system is similar
to the one applied in Chile during the period and it clearly provides a simulation that
approximates to the empirical observation.
[Insert ﬁgure 14]
Why does the long run capital stock drop in this case? It will be easy to obtain intuition
from the ﬁrst order condition of the individual ﬁrms. As in section 2, we may write the















@kt+1 is the expected marginal beneﬁt of
investment. In the long run equilibrium, comparative statics in this equation yields:
19similar to the current case in Chile
20From an initial level of 1.62 to 0.94 when ¿ = 0:15;¾ = z = 0










Where D < 0 by second order conditions, Ck < 0 by properties of the adjustment cost
function and k¤ is the long run level of capital stock. The intuition is that as we increase
the tax rate, the marginal return from the capital stock is lowered22. As a consequence,
ﬁrms will accumulate less capital stock.
Consider next the case: ¿ = (¾+z) = 0:15;8t. Figure 15 shows the stationary distribution
in this case, while the 9th column of table 1 presents its moments. Notice that quite
surprisingly the distribution is exactly the same as the one obtained with no distortions
and thus, the economy accumulates capital stock in the same way as in an economy with
no distortions. Why? When ¿ = (¾ +z);8t the relative price of investment is not distorted
and therefore the investment decision is not varied. This is the same result indicated in
section 2 when we assumed ¿ = (¾ + z);8t. In that section we indicated that the relative
price of investment is not distorted and thus the investment decision is not distorted either,
up to the income eﬀect produced by the sum-lump tax in the initial level of capital. This
last eﬀect is not important in the long run23 though.
[Insert ﬁgure 15]
How do we interpret this case? This tax system is analogous to implement a simple tax
over retired proﬁts of the ﬁrms, as shown in equation (4). It follows that taxing retired
proﬁts will not aﬀect the optimal capital stock accumulation.
In conclusion, taxing ﬁrm’s proﬁts might have important eﬀects over the long run level
of capital stock because the tax impacts the marginal return of the capital stock. However,
it is possible to implement a tax system that do not aﬀect investment decision. This system
will tax retired proﬁts, rather than current proﬁts. This result follows from the fact that
22the change in the marginal return from capital stock is given by the change in expected proﬁts, Et
@¼
@k,
and the change in the adjustment cost function,
@C
@k
23In the long run, the initial level of capital stock completely depreciates and thus, taxing the initial level
of capital stock does not matter to determine the long run level of capital stock
21this system does not distort the relative price of investment and it is similar to implement
jointly a tax in current proﬁts and a subsidy in investment through direct investment credits
or through the use of depreciation allowances.
The ”second-best” tax system
The above result indicated that there exists a tax system that minimize distortions in
investment decisions. However, when deriving that policy we did not restrict our attention
to the set of policies providing a required level of government revenue. This last dimension
of the problem is quite important though, because obviously the government impose a tax
system to collect revenues. This subsection will focus in solving the investment problem,
but restricting the attention to tax systems providing a given level of revenues required by
the government.
To derive our tax system, we will consider a large combination of policies. We will consider
any tax system that might have ¿ 2 [0;0:01;:::;0:2] and (¾ + z) 2 [0;0:01;:::;0:2]. Thus
we will evaluate 441 diﬀerent tax systems. Figure 16 shows a large variation in the long
run level of capital among the diﬀerent tax possible systems. The capital stock ranges from
0.8 when ¿ = 0:20;¾ + z = 0 to 3.2 when ¿ = 0;¾ + z = 0:2. An obvious qualiﬁcation is
that the ﬁrst policy will provide positive revenues to the government while the second will
provide negative revenues to the government.
[Insert ﬁgure 16]
We next restrict our attention to tax policies that provide a given level (range) of revenues.
Figure 17 illustrates the combination of policies that provide a collection of revenues between
2.0 and 2.5 units of output per ﬁrm, where the graph normalizes to zero any policy that
provides a diﬀerent revenue. The ﬁgure shows that there is a set of policies policies providing
the required level of revenues and each policy has associated a diﬀerent level of capital stock
in the long run. The associated long run capital stock for each policy can be seen in table 2.
The ”second-best” policy is the one providing the largest level of capital stock in the long
run, among this set of policies. Two conclusions emerge from ﬁgure 17 and table 2. First,
22the ”ﬁrst-best” policy is not available, meaning that it does not provide the required level
of government revenue. Second, the maximum level of long run capital stock is obtained
when ¿ = 0:12;¾ + z = 0, which is the tax system with lowest level corporate tax rate and
investment subsidies.
[Insert ﬁgure 17 and table 2]
Why do we obtain the minimum level of corporate tax rate possible as ”second-best” tax
policy? From equation (10), we know that the relative price of investment depends in the
tax system. The fourth column of table 2 shows this relative price for each possible tax
policy. The relative price is the smallest when ¿ = 0:12 and (¾ + z) = 0. As we move to
other tax policies, the relative price increases and thus investment will face less incentives.
Thus the ”second-best” policy is the tax system that minimizes the distortion in the relative
price of investment.
Figure 18 and table 3 show the same exercise for a smaller required revenue. The result
reaﬃrms our conclusion, meaning that the policy with the smallest corporate tax rate is
the one that maximizes the long run level of capital stock, since it has the smallest relative
price of investment.
[Insert ﬁgure 18 and table 3]
CONCLUSION
We propose a framework that considers microeconomic decisions to evaluate aggregate
investment behavior in the economy. We validate the model by replicating the distribution
of ﬁrms, in the Chilean economy, across investment decisions.
We obtain strong results and policy recommendations. First, and contrary to other
studies, we conclude that the tax system signiﬁcantly aﬀect the long run level of capital
stock when it taxes current ﬁrms proﬁts. Second, we indicate that the ”ﬁrst-best” policy is
to tax retired proﬁts, rather than current proﬁts. Third when the ”ﬁrst-best” policy is not
available, because it does not provide enough revenues, we should implement a tax system
23that minimize the distortion over the relative price of investment. This tax system is a
mixture of zero subsidies (credit to investment and depreciation allowances) and positive
but small corporate tax.
This study should be extended to include liquidity constraints in ﬁrms. This last factor
might be quite important when considering a economy with a large fraction of ﬁrms of
small size, as those ﬁrms are not able to provide the collateral required to borrow from the
banking system. This might aﬀect the stationary distribution and thus the long run level
stock of capital because it imposes an upper-bound in each ﬁrm’s investment decision.
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Figure 10: Optimal capital accumulation, negative shock






































Figure 11: Optimal capital accumulation, neutral shock





































Figure 12: Optimal capital accumulation, positive shock

































































    Observed          Simulated   
     distribution         distribution  
                 
  1990 1991  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996  Mean  (1990-96) τ=σ+z=0 τ=15%;σ+z=0 τ=σ+z=20%
 Std. Dev.  102.3%  132.9%  138.6%  113.7% 135.2% 124.1% 135.1% 126%  71.0%  71.2%  71% 
 Skewness  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  5.5% 1.9%  5.5% 
  Kurtosis  0.1% 0.1%  0.2%  0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%  0.1%  175%  34%  175% 
                 
Observations  187 232  192  212 212 297           
 
The source of the data is the 1990-96 versions of the ENIA. The moments are measured as fraction of the mean of the distribution. The column "mean" 






















































Long Run Capital Stock, 2<Rev<2.5
Z+ Inv. Credit Corporate tax Capital Stock Relative price
% % Inv.
0 12 1.0647 1.1932
1 16 0.9308 1.2375
2 20 0.8219 1.2863
Table 3
Long Run Capital Stock, 0.5<Rev<1
Z+ Inv. Credit corporate tax capital stock relative price
% % inv.
0 4 1.412 1.0938
1 8 1.2667 1.1299
2 12 1.1297 1.1693
3 15 1.0522 1.1982
4 18 0.9597 1.2293
5 20 0.9039 1.2469